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CHOICE OF LAW WITHIN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:
ERIE VERSUS HANNA
E. Blythe Stason, Jr.f
The author exaipines the unique device of diversity jurisdiction and its
place among the federal-state interrelationships created by the Constitution,
with particular consideration being given to the problem of characterization.
He then concludes that the recent decision of Hanna v. Plumer, insofar
as it tends to limit the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, works a partial
return to the discredited doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. In so doing, he argues,
it encourages forum-shopping, promotes discrimination against nondiverse
parties, and effects an unconstitutional invasion of rights guaranteed to the
states by the tenth amendment.
Literature dealing with the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts has
been scholarly and voluminous, particularly that written since the epoch-
making opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.1 Re-
cently, however, interest in the field has been sharply revived by the
leading case of Hanna v. Plumer,2 which threatens to restrict the appli-
cability of Erie in cases where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
involved, and perhaps to replace it'with something very much akin to the
ancient and discredited doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. This alarming pros-
pect, which may lead to distortion of the federal system and interference
with the constitutional rights and powers it seeks to protect, has prompted
the writing of this article. Its purpose is twofold: first, to examine the
unique constitutional device of diversity jurisdiction, the problems en-
countered over the years in seeking to satisfactorily employ this device,
and the ways in which federal courts-particularly the Supreme Court-
have attempted to solve these problems; and second, to present Erie and
Hanna as opposites, the former serving as a source of reaffirmation and
strength for the federal system and the latter as a source of alteration,
sapping the strength from that system. Fulfillment of the first purpose
will lay a foundation for consideration of the second.
f A.B. 1946, MA. 1947, LL.B. 1956, Michigan; LLM. 1957, Harvard. Assistant Professor
of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The development of Erie has been extensively documented; see, e.g.,
Clark, "State Law In the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,"
55 Yale LJ. 267 (1946); Cook, "'Substance' and TProcedure' in the Conffict of Laws," 42
Yale L.J. 333 (1933); Friendly, "In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,"
39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383 (1964); Tunks, "Categorization and Federalism: 'Substance,' and
'Procedure' After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," 34 III. L. Rev. 271 (1939).
2 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For commentary on Hanna, see materials cited in note 78 infra.
- 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For a discussion of Swift, see text accompanying notes 26-28
infra.
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DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: CREATION AND Aims
A. Characterization and Its Significance
- The basic problem is one of characterization. 4 This problem was
created by the crucial placement of diversity jurisdiction at the very
heart of the federal constitutional system. In the first three articles of
the Constitution the powers specifically granted by the states to the
federal government are set forth; in the tenth amendment, all other
powers are explicitly reserved to the states or to the people.5 The Con-
stitution also provides6 for suits in federal courts between parties of
diverse citizenship upon rights created by the states under powers re-
served to them in the tenth amendment. Under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution and the Rules of Decisions Act7 in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins,' however, state law must govern the substantive rights
of the parties. Federal law is thereby confined to the subordinate role of
establishing the judicial mechanisms by which those rights are to be
enforced. As a result, thre interrelated key questions frequently arise
in diversity cases: first, whether a given issue must be classified for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction as "substantive," thereby requiring ap-
plication of appropriate state law, or "procedural," and therefore properly
governed by the diversity court's own rules;' second, whether a particular
right created under state law is "substantive" in the Erie sense, and
must therefore be enforced in the diversity court even though it does
not exist under federal law; and third, whether use of a federal "pro-
cedural" law which is applicable in terms may impinge upon the state-
created "substantive" right in issue and must therefore be denied appli-
cation under Erie. The applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil
4 In the law of conflicts, "characterization" is the process of categorizing a particular case
or issue as, e.g., either substance or procedure, tort or contract, in order to determine which
jurisdiction's law is applicable.
5 The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." It has been partially implemented by the Rules of Decision Act, quoted in
note 8 infra.
6 Article III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend . . to Controversies ...between
Citizens of different States . .. ."
7 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). That act, as amended, reads as follows:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9 The terms "substance" and "procedure" are misleading and difficult to live with, at
least in the context of diversity jurisdiction. They cannot be avoided, however, for no
satisfactory substitutes can presently be found to designate, respectively, issues of the parties'
substantial rights and those concerning the mode of judicially enforcing those rights.
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Procedure is of particular significance in considering the last of these
questions.
The problems of diversity jurisdiction center upon the need for a con-
stitutional and realistic means of attaining predictability. This need cau"
be fulfilled only by a flexible yet reliable standard designed specifically to
determine whether any given matter is "substantive" in the diversity
sense.' Such a standard is difficult to establish, as the cases reveal. 11
One is necessary, however, in this area where state and federal con-
stitutional powers often collide, in order to create a meaningful and
constitutional division of function between federal laws that regulate
the judicial mechanics of diversity courts and state laws that create the
rights upon which actions are brought in those courts.
Any standard used to fulfill this function must be a subtle one, de-
signed for case-by-case application rather than for general use, and
taking account of the potentially-invaded state right, the state policy
upon which that right is based,"2 and the degree to which application of
the federal rule appears likely to invade the right in question. Unless
general guidelines are embodied in legislation, the development of such a
standard is bound to be a slow process. Since Erie and Hanna provide
somewhat contradictory approaches to establishing a standard, the use-
10 The need for an individualized standard of "substance-procedure" characterization has
been noted by several authors. For example, the late Professor W. W. Cook described eight
different purposes for "substance-procedure" characterization and insisted that a different
standard must be used for each. Cook, supra note 1, at 341-47.
11 Justice Frankfurter, in his majority opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945), stated forcefully that the usual tests for distinguishing "substance" and "proce-
dure" are worse than useless in the diversity context. He said:
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about in the
books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law.
But, of course, "substance" and "procedure" are the same key-words to very different
problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" represents the same invariants. Each
implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used....
And the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the terms are in com-
mon use in connection with situations turning on such different considerations as those
that are relevant to questions pertaining to ex post facto legislation, the impairment of
the obligations of contract, the enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and
the multitudinous phases of the conflict of laws.
Id. at 108.
Professor Leflar has illustrated the problem in this area by setting forth several kinds of
issues whose characterization as either wholly "substantive" or wholly "procedural" is logi-
cally impossible, for, while they concern matters traditionally "procedural," their resolution
is more than likely to have an important effect upon the parties' rights. His examples are (1)
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a jury verdict, (2) need for a jury trial, (3) joinder or
misjoinder of parties, (4) statutes of limitations, (5) measure of damages, (6) statutes of
frauds, (7) the parol evidence rule, (8) rules regarding placement of the burden of proof,
(9) conditions necessary to maintain an action, and (10) allowance of setoffs and counter-
claims. Leflar, Conflict of Laws 106 (1959).
12 But the policy behind the federal rule that otherwise would be applicable should not be
considered. It was in the assertion that considerations of federal policy are relevant to the
enforcement of state-created rights in diversity tribunals that the Court made its chief error
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see text accompanying notes 60-63
infra.
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fulness of these approaches must be considered. If only one basic policy
is to be used, it would be preferable to continue the case-by-case develop-
ment of Erie rather than to use Hanna to revive the ghost of Swift v.
Tyson.
B. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Federal Union
Problems of characterization penetrate to the very heart of diversity
jurisdiction, and involve policy as well as constitutional considerations.
Therefore, in order to weigh the various possible solutions to these prob-
lems, one must understand something of the nature and requirements of
our federal constitutional system and of the central role played in the
system by diversity jurisdiction.
The first point to be noted is that the concept of diversity jurisdiction
is indeed unique, arising as it does from the nature of the federal govern-
ment as one of delegated powers. Within this context, one function
of the Constitution was to establish interrelationships between the nation
and the states at important points of contact. There are many such
interrelationships, even apart from the federal government's power to
supersede state legislation in areas of competence constitutionally dele-
gated to the nation. 3 Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which
establishes the federal-state relation at issue in this article, provides for
the creation of a federal judicial system which in some respects is both
parallel to and a partner of those of the several states. The concept of
"diversity jurisdiction" created by that section was subsequently imple-
mented by the Rules of Decisions Act.' 4 The constitutional connection
between federal and state judicial systems thus established has disturbed
the tranquility of federal courts almost since the day of its creation.
It is evident that diversity jurisdiction, lying as it does at the very
center of the federal-state relationships created by the Constitution, is
the principal point at which the judicial affairs of nation and states are
inextricably intertwined. It is also evident that a carefully balanced
maintenance of those relationships without constitutional distortion
favoring the one or the other is essential to the preservation and proper
functioning of our federal union. The full implications of that union and
its operation are far outside the scope of this discussion, yet its nature,
and the interrelationships of the state and federal courts that form a part
of it, must constantly be considered for an adequate understanding of
13 For example, this interrelationship is also evident in the constitutionally established
method of electing United States Senators and Representatives and in the fact that state
law often determines questions of legal status which arise in the exercise of federal taxation,
interstate commerce, and bankruptcy powers.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), quoted in note 8 supra.
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the problems of diversity jurisdiction. Furthermore, since every diversity
case necessarily has a constitutional aspect as well as one involving con-
flict of laws, the constitutional implications of diversity jurisdiction must
always be kept in mind.
C. Possible Kinds of Uniformity in Diversity Courts
The question of uniformity bears directly on the basic problem of
characterization outlined above. Once diversity judges began to think
in terms of some sort of uniform connection between diversity and other
types of judicial jurisdiction, the question arose as to what the proper
uniformity was. If it were concluded that the proper uniformity is intra-
state uniformity of substantive result in each case, regardless of whether
that case is tried in the local or diversity courts of the state in question,
then the diversity court would face the problem of characterizing a
given issue as "substantive" or "procedural." But if it were concluded,
as in Swift v. Tyson, 5 that the preferable uniformity is a nationwide ap-
plication of "federal general common law" to all state-created rights of
general significance not governed by local statute, then the diversity
court would avoid the problem of characterization.
Although state courts are also plagued by uniformity problems in
conflict-of-laws cases,16 the most difficult problems lie within the realm
of federal diversity jurisdiction, where the close interplay of the national
and state governments requires that careful, purpose-oriented regulation
be combined with reliable judicial self-discipline. In this context intra-
state uniformity of substantive result in each case appears to be the only
permissible type of uniformity, for it alone guards against encroachment
by federal courts upon the states' constitutionally reserved powers,
15 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
16 To the extent that any decision or statute adopts a choice-of-law rule which anticipates
the application of the law of another jurisdiction, it is at least partially concerned with
uniformity. The nondiversity situation differs from the federal problem discussed in this
article principally in that the former does not involve a tenth amendment issue.
Unequal enforcement in state courts of rights that involve interstate conflicts has resulted
from application of varying choice-of-law rules to substantially identical situations. Tort lw
is, perhaps, the principal area of difficulty. The established choice-of-law rule for tort is
that the law of the place where the wrong occurred-the "lex loci delicti"--governs the
right of recovery. This rule often has the advantage of simplicity and predictability, but it
has been criticized as rigid and arbitrary where the incident or parties were meaningfully
connected with more than one jurisdiction. The result in some jurisdictions has been a 'partial
or complete abandonment of the lex delicti rule in favor of a more realistic, if less predict-
able, one. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), 51 Cornell L.Q. 779 (1966); Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) ; Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) (local law of state having "most significant
relationship" determines rights and liabilities in tort). So long as choice-of-law rules are in
a state of flux at the state level, as they presently are, they will create additional problems
for diversity courts which, under the case of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941), must apply the conflicts rules of the states in which they sit.
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thereby preventing alteration of the intended nature of the federal union.
There is a second and perhaps more important reason for Oniformity
between the diversity court and the courts of the state in which it sits.
Rights created by the states under their reserved powers are usually
enforceable only in state tribunals, for diversity jurisdiction is but an
ptional privilege open to the comparative few. It is therefore important
parties unable to claim diversity jurisdiction that the results obtainable
n the courts that are open to them be identical in all important respects
o those available in identical actions in the diversity courts of the states
in question. As the Supreme Court has frequently said, the accident of
diversity of citizenship must not be permitted to work discrimination
against nondiverse parties similarly situated." This federal-state uni-
formity of judicial result is related to preservation of state reserved
powers, because both are required by the Constitution and neither can
be achieved unless diversity courts always determine the parties' full
"substantive" rights under state law alone. Although this identity of
result is now constitutionally assured to nondiverse parties under Erie's
soundly conceived extension of the equal protection clause,"8 ohe rkinds
of uniformity have been attempted in the past in the diversity courts.
In all, three types have been sought.
1. Uniform Application of "Federal General Common Law": Swift v.
Tyson. The earliest type of uniformity attempted by the Supreme Court,
first enunciated in the leading case of Swift v. Tyson,19 governed the
decisions of diversity courts during the nineteenth century and the first
third of the twentieth. In Swift, Mr. Justice Story announced as existing
doctrine the rule that "substantive" issues involving rights that are of
more than mere local importance, but which have been established by
the states under judicial decision rather than statute, must be resolved
by diversity courts under "federal general common law."2
Proponents of this rule had hoped that it would be applied even by the
state courts when they were faced with "diversity" situations, so that
nationwide uniformity of substantial result in every diversity case
could thereby be secured. That hope proved futile, however, for the
Swift rule was largely unworkable in practice. State courts declined to
abandon their own laws, the lower federal courts frequently differed
among themselves, and area after area to which Swift had originally
17 See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947).
18 while states alone are explicitly controlled by the fourteenth amendment, the Erie
Court found the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson unconstitutional partly because it rendered im-
possible the equal protection of the laws guaranteed therein. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
19 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
20 Id. at 18-19.
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applied was withdrawn from its reach through enactment by the states
of appropriate statutory regulation. Moreover, the Swift rule had the
far graver defect of unconstitutionality. First, it required diversity courts
to invade powers that were guaranteed by the Constitution to the states
but had not yet been implemented by local statute. Second, it was the
source of harmful and unconstitutional discrimination against parties
unable to claim trial of their causes of action in diversity tribunals. This
discrimination was made possible by the fact that diversity tribunals were
bound to apply "federal general common law" to state-created rights
while the state tribunals could apply their own law to the same situa-
tions. This promptly led to forum-shopping for favorable substantial
results by those to whom diversity jurisdiction was available.
2. Uniformity of Su¢bstantial Result Within the State: Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins. After hope for nationwide application of federal common
law under Swift v. Tyson had diminished under the combined impact
of attack and neglect, it was finally destroyed by the incisive opinion
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.=' Erie overruled Swift
upon the twin grounds of its unconstitutionality and its failure to achieve
the objectives for which it had been decided. It did much more, how-
ever, by replacing the Swift rule with the requirement that diversity
courts decide all "substantive" issues under appropriate state law. This
requirement was designed to secure intrastate uniformity of result in all
actions based upon state-created rights, regardless of the forum in which
their enforcement might be sought, and thereby to prevent discrimination
against parties unable to claim diversity jurisdiction. Since the uniformity
prescribed in Erie is both constitutionally required and manifestly de-
sirable, the opinion in that case must be regarded as the root of virtually
all acceptable modern diversity doctrine.2
While the Erie opinion does not provide a guide for characterizing
applicable law as either "substantive" or "procedural," the policies
behind the case indicate that characterization should not be undertaken
with jealous concern for the sanctity of the Federal Rules or any other
federal "procedural" law as such, but should be used strictly to insure
intrastate uniformity of result. Although the judicial precept that diver-
sity courts are mere coordinate, forum-state tribunals is inaccurate and
misleading as a general statement,23 it is certainly true with regard to their
ultimate function of deciding state-law actions under state "substantive"
21 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22 Not all commentators think so. For forceful criticism of Erie, see Keeffe, Gilhooley,
Bailey & Day, "Weary Erie," 34 Cornell L.Q. 494 (1949).
23 But the Supreme Court has, on occasion, made that statement. See Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947).
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law and thereby removing all substantial advantage from the right to
claim diversity jurisdiction.
3. Uniform Application of the Federal Rules: Hanna v. Plumer. The
question of whether characterization standards developed under Erie are
applicable where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are involved was
not thoroughly discussed by the Supreme Court until 1965.24 Then,
in the leading case of Hanna v. Plumer,25 the Court held that where a state
"procedural" law and its counterpart in the Federal Rules are mutually
antagonistic, and each is applicable in terms to an issue that can "ration-
ally" be classified as either "substantive" or "procedural," the Federal
Rule must govern despite its incidental "substantive" effect upon the
rights of the parties. The uniformity admittedly sought in Hanna was a
rigid, exceptionless application of the Federal Rules that took no adequate
account of any consequent infringement upon state-created rights or dis-
crimination against parties unable to claim diversity jurisdiction. It is sub-
mitted that Hanna thereby produced an unconstitutional and otherwise
undesirable result, since diversity jurisdiction was designed to secure state-
created rights in federal courts, and that purpose should not be thwarted
in an effort to reach the relatively minor goal of federal "procedural"
uniformity.
II
THE PRINcIPAL DIVERSITY CASES
A. Swift v. Tyson: Study of a Misguided Ideal
In order to appraise these several uniformities in the light of major
policy considerations, it is necessary to reexamine Swift and Erie. In
Swift, the defendant Tyson had bought land from Keith and had accepted
a bill of exchange drawn upon him for the purchase price. The bill was
then assigned by Keith to Swift, a bona fide purchaser. The land proved
to be much less valuable than represented to Tyson, and in addition
Keith's title was defective. Tyson tried to raise these defenses when sued
by Swift. Under the common law of New York, it was possible that this
defense could be asserted against a bona fide purchaser, although the
law was not clear. However, under United States decisional law, if it were
applicable, it was clear that the plaintiff would prevail. The defendant
asserted the Rules of Decision Act,2 6 which provided that state "laws"
24 Diversity cases involving the Federal Rules have, however, been before the Court on
other occasions. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941). These cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 64-77 supra.
25 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
26 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). [Emphasis added.] The Rules of
Decisions Act, substantially as asserted in Swift, is quoted-in note 7 supra.
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should be regarded as "rules of decision" in actions at common law in
the federal courts, and he argued that the word "laws" included de-
cisional law as well as state statutes. The Court, however, disagreed with
this interpretation of the act and held for the plaintiff under federal
common law. Mr. Justice Story stated that the word "laws" referred to
local usages and state statutes alone.
[T]he Courts of New York do not found their decisions [on the issue
here involved] . . .upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient
local usage: but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles of
commercial law. . . . It never has been supposed by us, that the [word
"laws", as used in the Rules of Decision Act] . . .did apply, or was de-
signed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent
upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation....27
It is clear, as previously discussed, that this decision is subject to se-
vere criticism on many grounds. But not only was Swift unsuccessful in
its own time; its philosophy is also especially unsuited to the needs of
today's mobile society. Since state causes of action now arise much more
frequently among parties of diverse citizenship, and since diversity of
citizenship can often be fabricated for the occasion, a resurrection of
Swift v. Tyson would lead to far more forum-shopping, and consequent
discrimination, than it ever did in the nineteenth century.2" As we shall
27 Swift v. Tyson, supra note 26, at 18-19. Justice Story, in holding that federal common
law was applicable, announced his reliance in this connection upon the so-called "discovered
law" theory, now in wide judicial disfavor. Pronouncement upon a subject so esoteric as
the various theories regarding the origin of law is inappropriate here. It should be noted,
however, that the "discovered law" doctrine seems peculiarly unsuited to a country like the
United States, whose judicial decisions have a binding effect similar to that of statutes until
they are overruled or superseded by legislation. In addition, it is difficult to understand how
Justice Story reconciled himself to his insistence upon the "discovered law" theory so as to
deny full effect to state-court decisions while at the same time obviously holding the view
that United States Supreme Court decisions were binding as law upon all to whom they
properly applied.
Justice Story's pronouncement in Swift that "laws of the several states" as used in the
Rules of Decision Act does not include state-court decisions has been seriously questioned.
See Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 49, 52, 81-88 (1923). See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938).28 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)
exemplifies the outrageous lengths to which some parties were prepared to go in forum-
shopping under the rule of Swift. In that case, both parties had been Kentucky corporations
when the claim under a contract unenforceable in Kentucky had accrued. Plaintiff, however,
realizing it could win under federal common law, established its claim to diversity jurisdiction
by reincorporating in another state prior to bringing the action. The Supreme Court found
the contract enforceable under federal common law and accordingly held for plaintiff. This
disposition drew a strong dissent from Justice Holmes, who said:
[Iln my opinion the prevailing [Swift] doctrine has been accepted upon a subtle fallacy
that never has been analyzed .... The fallacy has resulted in an unconstitutional as-
sumption of powers by the Courts of the United States.... The often repeated proposi-
tion of this and the lower Courts is that the parties are entitled to an independentjudgment on matters of general law.... It is through this phrase that what I think
[sic] the fallacy comes in. ...
.... It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august corpus, to under-
stand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there were such a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless
1967]
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see, this is precisely the fault of Hanna v. Plumer,29 which effectuates a
partial return to Swift, although in the guise of "federal procedural law"
rather than "general federal common law."
As the era of Swift v. Tyson drew to a close, Congress anticipated its
final demise. In the Rules Enabling Act,80 it gave the Supreme Court au-
thority to adopt the regulations now known as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but limited that authority by a prohibition against its use at
the expense of state reserved powers. 1
B. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: Source of Modern Diversity Doctrine
The basis of modern diversity doctrine was laid in 1938 by the conjunc-
tion of two significant events-the Court's adoption under the Rules
Enabling Act of a code of federal "procedure" designed to replace the
state procedural laws which had previously bound diversity courts in
common-law actions, and the ruling in Erie RR. v. Tompkins 2 that di-
versity cases must be decided under state "substantive" law.
33
and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using
their independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The
fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside
thing to be found.... [L]aw in the sense in which cburts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced
in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the
law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may
have been in England or anywhere else.
.... If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of general law the
decisions of the highest Court should establish the law until modified by statute or by a
later decision of the same Court, I do not perceive how it would be possible for a
Court of the United States to refuse to follow what the State Court decided in that
domain.
Id. at 532-34 (dissenting opinion). For an earlier Holmes dissent to the same effect, see Kuhn
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910).
29 Supra note 25. Hanna indicates that a return to Swift is not a remote possibility.
Hanna, of course, will not permit the broad forum-shopping encouraged by Swift, for the
only federal law it directly involves is the Federal Rules. It shares with Swift, however, the
unfortunate characteristic of arbitrary and virtually unreasoned insistence upon application
of federal law at the expense of discrimination against nondiverse parties and infringement
upon powers constitutionally reserved to the states. The close basic similarity of the two
cases renders unimportant the fact that the federal laws involved are the Rules Enabling
Act and the Federal Rules adopted thereunder, instead of the "general common law" in-
volved in Swift.30 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
31 The statute provides, in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts of the United States in Civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .[Emphasis added.] The Enabling Act, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that were
adopted under it in 1938, were designed to, and did, eliminate the confusion and incon-
venience resulting from the fact that while equity suits in the federal courts. were governed
by a federal code of equity procedure, the Conformity Act of 1872 required conduct of
actions at law under forum state procedural rules. See Clark, Code Pleading 33-34 (2d ed.
1947).
32 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33 Id. at 79-80. Many, including justice Holmes, had believed that solution of the con-
[Vol. 52
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In Erie, the plaintiff was struck by a train while trespassing upon
Erie's Pennsylvania right-of-way, and sought recovery from the railroad
in a New York diversity court. There was no pertinent federal or Penn-
sylvania statute. The degree of negligence proved against Erie, however,
permitted recovery under federal common law but not under the law of
Pennsylvania. Erie denied liability on the ground that Pennsylvania law
was applicable because the injury had occurred in that state. Tompkins
objected, contending that federal common law must govern under Swift
v. Tyson in the absence of an applicable state statute. Speaking for the
Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis sustained Erie's argument and reversed the
judgment of the lower courts, thereby overruling Swift v. Tyson.34
While the Erie opinion did not deal with the Federal Rules,8 5 it was
written by a Court well aware that their application under some circum-
stances could produce the "substantive" effect forbidden in virtually iden-
tical terms by both the Enabling Act under which they had been adopted
and Erie itself. It seems clear, therefore, that the policy of Erie, to pre-
vent unconstitutional discrimination against local citizens and invasion
of state powers, is applicable in all diversity cases whether they involve
Federal Rules or not. 6 In applying that policy to the facts of the case
before it, the Erie Court abolished the "spurious" uniformity of Swift v.
Tyson and established in its stead a viable standard based upon uniform-
ity of substantial result.3 7 Though Erie has been criticized, as would any
stitutional and practical problems presented by the aged and ailing rule of Swift v. Tyson did
not require the harsh step of overruling the ninety-two year-old case itself. They believed
that the rule was already dying a natural death and could readily be put to final rest by
the more seemly means of a neglect that could be justified by finding it inapplicable under
the facts of case after case. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82-86 (1938) (con-
curring opinion of Justice Butler). The opinion of Justice Brandeis avoided the need for
this lengthy procedure and thereby inaugurated a new chapter in diversity jurisdiction.
34 Some authors believe the constitutional language of Erie to be mere dictum, saying that
the case could have been decided upon nonconstitutional grounds. See, e.g., Clark, supra
note 1, at 278; Cook, "The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws," 36 Ill. L. Rev. 493
(1942); Currie, "Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 405, 468-69
(1955). For examples of the contrary view that Erie is a constitutional decision, see Broh-
Kahn, "Amendment by Deision-More on the Erie Case," 30 Ky. LJ. 3, 5 (1941) ; Currie,
"Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction," 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 341, 351
(1960) ; Friendly, supra note 1, at 402; Hill, "The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution," 53
Nw. L. Rev. 427, 439 (1958); Vestal, "Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection," 48 Iowa L.
Rev. 248, 254 (1963).
-5 For a discussion of cases which touched upon the Federal Rules, see text accompanying
notes 64-77 infra.
36 The rule and policy of Erie must be differentiated with clarity. The rule is not par-
ticularly useful, because it was established to deal with a situation in which no difficult issue
of characterization was involved, and is therefore difficult to apply where such an issue is
presented. On the other hand, Erie policy, forbidding diversity courts to usurp state powers
and discriminate against nondiverse local parties, seems plainly to govern every diversity
action. Indeed, it has been held applicable where federal jurisdiction was based upon grounds
other than diversity of citizenship. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234
F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
37 This new uniformity will accordingly be termed "Erie uniformity."
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opinion overruling judicial doctrine considered binding for nearly a hun-
dred years,38 its rule and policy are strongly established within their
scope and are likely to remain so.
However, since the facts of Erie presented no real problem of diversity
characterization, the development of the Erie standards was left for later
cases. The courts achieved this objective concurrently with the process of
extending Erie by characterizing certain doubtful issues39 and laws40 as
"substantive" for diversity purposes. The following examination of cases
extending the scope of Erie and developing standards for its application
will show uniform adherence to the basic principle implicit in Erie itself:
state powers may not be invaded by any means, including the often-
attempted characterization as "procedural" of matters that may bear
significantly upon rights of the parties.4 1
1. Extending the Scope of Erie. In Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co.,42
the first extension of the Erie rule, the Court readily concluded that suits
in equity must be governed by Erie principles in the same manner as ac-
tions at law. In Sampson v. Channell,8 the next case of importance, the
First Circuit was faced with the difficult problem of "multistate diversity
characterization." The court held that, for Erie purposes, the issue of
which party had the burden of proving the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was "substantive," and must therefore be decided under state law.
It then turned to the choice-of-law rule of the forum state, Massachusetts,
to determine whether the local law of the forum or of the place of the
accident (Maine) applied, and held that under that rule the question of
burden of proof was "procedural," and hence governed by the local law
of the forum.4 The First Circuit thus established a two-stage system of
38 Criticisms of Erie range from mild to virulent. For examples of the former sort, see
Clark, "Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union," 40 Texas
L. Rev. 211, 220 (1961); Corbin, "The Laws of the Several States," 50 Yale LJ. 762, 764
(1941) ; Vestal, supra note 34. For a thorough condemnation of Erie, see Keeffe, Gilhooley,
Bailey & Day, supra note 22.
39 E.g., placement of the burden of proof of contributory negligence.
40 E.g., statutes of limitation.
41 Mr. Justice Jackson enunciated that principle a decade after Erie was decided, saying:
Erie R-R. v. Tompkins and its progeny have wrought a . . . far-reaching change in
the relation of state and federal courts and the application of state law in the latter
whereby in diversity cases the federal court administers the state system of law in all
except details related to its own conduct of business.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949). [Emphasis added.]
42 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
48 110 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
44 Judge Magruder recognized the apparent inconsistency of a federal diversity court's
being required by Erie to apply a forum-state law which the courts of that state con-
sidered procedural. He said:
This result may seem to present a surface incongruity, viz., the deference owing to
the substantive law of Massachusetts as pronounced by its courts requires the federal
court in that state to apply a Massachusetts rule as to burden of proof which the highest
state court insists is procedural only. The explanation is that reasons of policy, set forth
in the Tompkins case, make it desirable for the federal court in diversity of citizenship
[Vol. 52
CHOICE OF LAW: ERIE VERSUS HANNA
characterization, which the Supreme Court promptly applied in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. 5 There the Supreme Court held that, after
an issue is classified as "substantive" in Stage I of the characterization
process, so that forum-state law is to apply, then in a multistate case the
diversity court must consult forum-state choice-of-law rules at Stage II in
order to produce a result substantially the same as that available in the
courts of that state.
In Griffin v. McCoak,46 the Court held that Erie uniformity requires
diversity courts to apply forum-state public policy.47 This development
was succeeded by Angel v. Bullington,48 where the Supreme Court held
that diversity tribunals must refuse to hear cases that would be barred
from the courts of the forum state.49 Finally, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
cases to apply the state rule, because the incidence of burden of proof is likely to have
a decisive influence on the outcome of litigation; and this is true regardless of whether
the state court characterizes the rule as one of procedure or substantive law. Certainly
the federal court in Massachusetts cannot treat burden of proof as a matter of procedure
in order to disregard the Massachusetts rule, and then treat it as substantive law in
order to apply the Maine rule.
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 762 (1940).
45 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Klaxon had been anticipated in an earlier opinion by Justice
Holmes. Speaking for the Court in Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918), he
held that a Texas diversity court was required to apply Texas choice-of-law rules. That
holding was in keeping with Holmes' consistent opposition to Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), pungently expressed in his dissent in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) ; see note 28 supra.
Klaxon and Sampson require the diversity court to consult the "entire" law of the forum,
including its choice-of-law rules, with the limitation that any reference from those rules
can be made only to the law of a third jurisdiction, never back to the federal law. The
doctrine thus created might be termed "diversity transmission renvoi"--surely an interesting
product of our federal system.
Application of the "whole" law of the jurisdiction whose "substantive" rules are applicable
has been approved in nondiversity cases as well. See Robertson, Characterization in the
Conflict of Laws 103-04 (1940), and Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), in which
the Court held that the principal provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842
(1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), requires the applicatidn of the whole law of the state
in which "the act or omission occurred," including the choice-of-law rules of that state.
This view imports renvoi, a doctrine that is less acceptable here than in Europe, but is
paradoxically required by Erie in multistate diversity cases. For an enthusiastic general
advocacy of renvoi in the United States, see the masterly and widely-cited article by Dean
Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
46 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
47 Professor Scoles, author of the fourth edition of Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1964),
has found Griffin "disturbing" because the Court there held that Erie governed in an
action entered by some of the parties on interpleader rather than diversity. Id. at 25
n.135. While the question deserves examination, it would seem that Erie must govern in
every federal trial of state-created causes of action, regardless of the means by which
the parties have been brought before the court.
48 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
49 In Angel, a forum-state "door-closing" statute barred actions for deficiency judgments
by the holders of security interests in real property. Angel was soon followed by Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), which held that diversity courts must follow
forum-state statutes barring actions by foreign corporations not qualified to do business in
the state. The earlier opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) had laid
the basis for Angel and Woods by holding that state law must be characterized as "substan-
tive" if its application is likely to affect the outcome of a diversity case. In Angel and Woods,
the Court found that state door-closing statutes qualified under that test. However, the
opinion of Judge Sobeloff in the recent case of Szantay v., Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d
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Co. of America ° extended Erie to an issue involving the validity of a con-
tract arbitration clause. The Court stated that the issue of the binding
effect of the arbitration clause was "substantive," and accordingly held
that Erie required the Vermont diversity court to grant the stay of an ac-
tion brought in contravention of the clause. It reasoned that Erie forbade
the diversity tribunal to deny arbitration under the contract clause in
question unless the forum-state courts would have done likewise under
their own law.
2. Developing Standards for Erie's Application. While Erie was thus
being extended to various matters not involved in that case itself, the
courts were necessarily engaged in a concurrent effort to establish stan-
dards by which Erie policy might rationally be applied in individual cases.
The troublesome cases have naturally been those whose issues involved
an intermingling of "procedural" and "substantive" elements, and could
not, therefore,' be placed with assurance upon one side of the line or the
other under conventional "substance-procedure" tests.
The leading case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 5 concerned a diversity
suit brought to compel Guaranty to purchase from the plaintiff certain
notes that Guaranty had agreed to buy under a contract which had ex-
pired by its terms before plaintiff became the owner of the notes. Guaranty
pleaded the state statute of limitations, but the district court and court
of appeals both held for the plaintiff on the ground that the statute of
limitations was not binding upon the diversity court. The Supreme Court
reversed.
Pointing out that "substance" and "procedure" must be defined
anew for use in each different context, and that definitions applicable
elsewhere are worse than useless in diversity matters,5 2 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter discussed the standard that is required for the unique purpose
of diversity characterization. State law must be considered "substantive"
under Erie, he continued, where its application vel non significantly
affects the result of the litigation. Erie, whose mandate governs all di-
versity cases:
60 (4th Cir. 1965), 51 Cornell L.Q. 560 (1966) indicates that, with regard to door-dosing
statutes, the York "outcome-determination" test must be limited by applying federal instead
of state law where the policy behind the federal law is stronger than that upon which the
state counterpart rests. In Szantay, it was accordingly held that federal policy considerations
relieved the diversity court of the need to enforce a forum-state statute which barred an
action between a nonresident and a foreign corporation upon a claim having no connection
with the state. Szantay, therefore, appears to go beyond the rule of Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and to implement the dictum in Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965) ; see text accompanying notes 60-64, 78-85, 107-112 infra.
50 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
51 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
52 Id. at 108; see note 11 supra.
[Vol. 52
CHOICE OF LAW: ERIE VERSUS HANNA
[E]xpressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial
power between State and federal courts .... [T]he intent of that decision
was to insure that, in all [diversity] cases .. the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court
. 3
Statutes of limitation are "substantive" in the diversity sense, Justice
Frankfurter concluded, because such statutes can bar an action upon a
valid state-created right. The fact that it is applied by the forum-state
tribunal but not in the diversity court may well cause recovery upon anyI
given right to depend upon the forum in which its enforcement is sought
-a result forbidden by Erie.
York, decided in 1945, is the first case in which the Erie policy regard-
ing Stage I characterization was thoroughly discussed. More significantly,
it established a standard that virtually became a part of Erie character-
ization policy. It remained unmodified until Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Co-op.5 4 was decided in 1958. That standard, the "outcome-determination
test," was defined by the Court in these words:
The question is ... whether such statutory limitation is a matter of sub-
stance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it
significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard
a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim
by the same parties in a State Court? 55
The York standard seems satisfactory because it is simple in state-
ment, quite predictable in its effect upon any given issue, and fairly easy
to apply. It is, however, much more. It is the only Stage I characterization
standard that accords with both the tenth and fourteenth amendments
and with Erie policy, now virtually a part of the Constitution. This is so
because York, when applied strictly as the sole Stage I characterization
test, assures the result that the tenth amendment and Erie demand-
application of every forum-state law that is likely to bear in any impor-
tant degree upon the substantial rights of the litigants, despite the fact
that such application may result in possible infringement upon mere fed-
eral "procedural" requirements. Only the most hardy devotee of federal)
authority would argue that any aspect of federal procedure can com-
pare in constitutional importance with the rights of diversity parties
guaranteed by the tenth and fourteenth amendments and the Rules of
Decisions Act."8  -
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement, that forum-state law must be ap-
53 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). [Emphasis added.]
54 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see text accompanying notes 60-64 infra.
55 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 53. [Emphasis added.]
56 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), quoted in note 8 supra.
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plied where the difference between that law and the corresponding federal
rule "significantly affects the result""57 in a particular diversity case, im-
plies that Erie-York58 is applicable only where such difference is sure to
influence the substantial result. Neither subsequent treatment of the out-
come-determination test, however, nor the facts of York itself, support
any such limitation. Even in York, the Court was unable to say with as-
gurance that the plaintiff would recover in diversity were the forum-state
statute of limitations found inapplicable. The Court, therefore, has not
limited the Erie-York test to cases where a difference in outcome is a
certainty.
On the other hand, the Court obviously appreciated the value of fed-
eral procedural uniformity.too keenly to apply that test where a difference
in outcome under federal law instead of its forum-state counterpart was
but a remote possibility. York must therefore be taken to require use of
forum-state law where denial of its application is reasonably likely to pre-
vent the federal-state judicial uniformity required by Erie. As a conse-
quence, York is not the engine for nullification of federal procedure in
diversity cases that some authorities have fearfully pictured.59 The basis
for this assertion is twofold: First, only a small fraction of diversity cases
appears to involve issues of Erie uniformity, and second, the York stan-
dard is applicable only where there is at least a reasonable possibility
that Erie uniformity will be destroyed under the corresponding federal
law. In view of the foregoing, York appears to have established the only
convenient and constitutional standard for Stage I diversity characteriza-
tion.
3. Reaction to the York Standard: Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op.
The characterization standard established by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
received apparent modification in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 0
where the Supreme Court indicated its growing resistance to the enforce-
ment of forum-state rules in diversity suits at the expense of inconsistent
federal law. In Byrd, the question was whether a diversity court could
properly order a jury trial of the fact issue involved, as required by
federal law, even though the state courts had held that the matter in issue
must be settled solely by the judge. In holding that federal law governed,
the Court stated that York "cannot in every case exact compliance with a
state rule-not bound up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the
57 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 53.
58 Since the "outcome-determination" test of York has become assimilated with Erie as
the primary standard for delimiting the latter's policy, it is frequently known as the "Erie-
York" test and will be so termed in the balance of this article.
59 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 38, at 220-21.
60 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury."'" Thus,
the Court indicated that where a strong federal policy is involved, state
law, though applicable under the Erie-York test, must give way to that
policy. The strength of the Federal policy in the present case was clear,
since the federal judiciary had always favored jury trial of all fact issues,
and this policy was reinforced by the constitutional requirement of jury
trial in federal common-law actions.62
The objections to Byrd, and the "policy-balancing" modification of
Erie-York for which it is cited, are so numerous and fundamental as to
cast grave doubt upon its validity as precedent in cases where the facts
materially differ from those involved in Byrd itself. The most serious ob-
jection concerns the basic position that federal policy considerations may
properly be said to have a bearing upon issues of Erie uniformity. Where a
case involves mutually exclusive federal and state rules, each of which is
nevertheless applicable in terms, it appears fair enough at first glance that
policy-balancing be employed as a basis for determining which of them
shall govern a particular issue. A closer examination of the problem,
however, reveals that the tenth amendment implicitly but clearly denies
any force to federal policy as a standard by which to determine whether
rights created under powers reserved to the states in that amendment may
properly be infringed, in any way important to the parties, by application
of federal "procedural" law in diversity courts. The mandate of the
61 Id. at 538. [Footnote omitted.]
62 Although the Byrd Court adverted to the seventh amendment's provision for jury
trials in federal common-law cases, it refrained from deciding the case before it on con-
stitutional grounds. Those grounds appear at least arguably valid, however, and might well
have been employed. The effect would have been to make Byrd a very limited modification
of Erie.
Because of the unexamined constitutional issue in Byrd, judge Friendly has questioned its
precedent value in cases involving essentially different fact situations:
Although some have seen Byrd . . . as a "landmark" case initiating a new trend as to
procedural matters, the decision seems to have been so clearly called for by the Seventh
Amendment as hardly to warrant this characterization, despite the opinion's peculiarly
delicate reference to the Constitution.
Friendly, "In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law," 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
383, 403 n.95 (1964). See Whicher, "The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Sug-
gested Resolution of Their Conflict," 37 Texas L. Rev. 549 (1959).
Various courts of appeal have acted differently in diversity cases involving inconsistent
federal and state jury requirements. Federal practice was followed in Order of Commercial
Travelers v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1955); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943); McSweeney v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 128 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942); Diederich v. American News
Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942); Gorham v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 114
F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 688 (1941). State requirements were found
to govern in Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 231 F.2d 922, (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 984 (1956); Pierce Consulting Eng'r Co. v. City of Burlington, 221 F.2d 607 (2d
Cir. 1955); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Glasgow, 208 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1953); Gutierrez v.
Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 168 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1948), Cooper v. Brown, 126 F.2d
874 (3d Cir. 1942). In view of the inconclusive effect of Byrd, therefore, the whole matter
of inconsistent federal and state jury requirements in diversity cases seems still very much
open to debate.
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Constitution is plain: Under no circumstance must federal law be applied
in significant derogation of rights created under power reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment. It follows that where such rights are
involved, federal policy considerations are constitutionally irrelevant.
Thus Byrd represents not only an attempt to modify the "outcome-
determination" test of York, but also an attempt to undercut the Erie
policy of uniformity. The Court attempted to avert such a contention by
indicating that it was not clear under the facts that "the likelihood of a
different result [was] ... so strong [that Erie would have required] ...
the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to
yield to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome."" But this
conclusion is difficult to justify, particularly since the Court, in its careful
formulation of the "policy-balancing" test, so heavily relied upon the
assumption that Erie-York did apply. Byrd, then, was a step in the direc-
tion of federal power taken at the expense of federalism; as such, it waI
a forerunner of Hanna -v. Plumer, a case in which the likelihood of al
different outcome resulting from application of federal law was blatantly
obvious.
C. Erie and the Federal Rules: A Prelude to Hanna
It can readily be seen from the above cases that for many years (ex-
cept in Byrd) the courts consistently applied the Erie policy to prevent
discrimination against nondiverse parties, with the principal standard of
application being that of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. But the cases ex-
amined thus far as indicative of the nature and strength of Erie policy did
not significantly involve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore(
we must now consider whether the involvement of the Rules measurabl)
affected the Court's treatment of Erie even before the decision in Hanna
v. Plumer. Three Supreme Court cases are of particular interest in this
connection.
(1) Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.64 Sibbacd was an action brought in an
Illinois diversity court to recover damages for bodily injury allegedly
sustained in an accident in Indiana. The respondent, denying the allega-
tions, moved under Federal Rules 35 and 37 for an order requiring that
the petitioner submit to a physical examination to determine the nature
and extent of her injuries. The requested order was granted, but the
petitioner, asserting the court's lack of authority to grant it, refused
compliance.
Petitioner argued that the "substantive-rights" limitation in the Rules
6 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958).
64 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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Enabling Act must be interpreted in the general sense as referring to
rights which are "substantial" or "important" to the parties. Since the
issue involving physical examination was one of substantial importance
to her, she continued, allowing the Federal Rules to govern that issue
would violate the Enabling Act, even though the applicable rules were
admittedly "procedural." The Federal Rules being inapplicable, the issue
would have to be resolved under forum-state law.
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument and ruled that, since the
issue in question was "procedural," the examination order had been prop-
erly granted. Admitting that the Federal Rules were confined under the
Enabling Act to matters deemed "procedural," the Court queried:
Is the phrase "substantive rights" confined to rights conferred by law to be
protected and enforced in accordance with the adjective law of judicial
procedure? .. .The petitioner says the phrase connotes more; that by its
use Congress intended that in regulating procedure this court should not
deal with important and substantial rights theretofore recognized. Recog-
nized where and by whom? The state courts are divided as to the power
in the absence of statute to order a physical examination."5
It then continued:
If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged
right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded.
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure-the judicia
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law andfor justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them.66
The Court then presented another reason why the Rules involved were
within the scope of the Enabling Act. They had, as had all the Federal
Rules, been submitted to Congress for examination and approval as "pro-
cedural" under( the act, and their acceptance indicated that Congress
had implicitly found them to comport with the Enabling Act and the con-
gressional policy reflected therein. This being so, the Rules must b
applicable for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The Court thus assertejl
that Congress is the ultimate arbiter of whether any given Rule is "pro-
cedural" in the diversity sense under the facts of the particular case
involved. That conclusion seems unjustified. The required congressional
examination of newly adopted Rules is necessarily a very general one, as'
65 Id. at 13. The Court thus overlooked the fact that legal uniformity among the states
is hardly germane in a particular diversity case. The question in such a case is not whether
the issue involved is governed by the same law in every state; it is whether that issue
affects the rights of the parties immediately concerned, and is therefore to be classified as
"substantive" in the diversity sense.
I6 Id. at 14. [Emphasis added.] This "test" appears to be no test at all, at least so far as
diversity jurisdiction is concerned. While rules may in terms provide solely for "administering
remedy and redress," application of such rules has frequently affected the parties' "rights and
duties recognized by the substantive law."
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is the determination of whether they are valid as "procedural" under the
Enabling Act. This does not, therefore, meet the Erie requirement that all
classification for diversity purposes be done in light of the particular facts
involved. Moreover, since the substance-procedure determination involves
constitutional considerations arising under the tenth and fourteenth
amendments, it is necessarily a matter for the courts, rather than Con-
gress, to decide.
In Hanna v. Plumer the Court was to rely heavily upon Sibbach to show
that Erie is inapplicable in diversity cases where Federal Rules are in-
volved. It is therefore important to realize that, while Sibbach is indeed
a diversity case in which Federal Rules were relied upon, it does not re-
ject Erie. On the contrary, the Sibbach Court, in interpreting the "sub-
stantive-rights" language of the Enabling Act, implicitly used the guide-
lines set by Erie's "substance-procedure" dichotomy. That is, it is ap-
parent that the Federal Rules at issue were in fact rules of procedure in
the Erie sense.
Moreover, Sibbach lacked the obvious clash between state law and Fed-
eral Rules which is the crucial and assertedly unique feature of Hanna.
Petitioner did not strongly argue that the Illinois rule which would dis-
allow an examination was applicable under Erie as substantive law, nor
could she have done so. Characterization of the rule as substantive would
have led to application of Indiana law which permitted an examination,
rather than to Illinois law, since Indiana was the place where the cause
of action arose.67 At any rate, whatever doubt existed as to whether the
Sibbach court was applying Erie or drifting toward a Hanna approach
was dispelled by the next case involving the Federal Rules.
(2) Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.6" In Ragan, a
complaint was filed in a Kansas diversity court in an action to recover for
an automobile accident injury. The complaint was filed within two years
after the claim accrued, but service of process had not been completed
within that time. The Kansas statute of limitations permitted two years
within which to bring such actions, and provided that tolling of the limita-
tion period began only when service of process was complete. Federal
Rule 3, which is not a statute of limitations, differs from the Kansas law
by stipulating that actions are commenced when the complaint is filed.
The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the Kansas
67 See id. at 10-11. Evidently, had the medical-examination issue been classified as "sub-
stantive," then the old lex locus delicti rule would have been applied; see note 16 supra.
Since Sibbach was decided prior to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), the case was not analyzed in terms of a difficult two-stage characterization problem;
see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 n.15 (1965).
68 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
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law was applicable and the action was barred. The diversity court denied
his motion upon the ground that Rule 3 was applicable and therefore the
action was timely commenced. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that
the state law governed under York.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas reasoned that a tolling provision is a part of the statute of limita-
tions to which it applies, since it specifies what the plaintiff must do to
avoid the bar of the statute. Were Rule 3 deemed to govern here, he con-
tinued, it would replace a portion of the Kansas statute of limitations
with a different but equivalent provision.6" The diversity court's applica-
tion of Rule 3 would thus violate the York rule that Erie uniformity may
not be infringed under a federal statute of limitations inconsistent with
that of the forum state.
, In Hanna, the majority opinion denied that Ragan had rejected a Fed-
eral Rule under Erie in favor of inconsistent forum-state law.70 But a
close analysis of Ragan clearly seems to indicate the opposite; that case
required application of a state rule that was an essential part of the statute
of limitations to which it applied, thereby barring application of the Fed-
eral Rule.71
(3) Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.72 The final case of this
series, Cohen, also involved the application of Erie policy to a Federal
Rules case. In Cohen, a shareholders' derivative action was brought
against the corporate defendant in a New Jersey diversity court. The
defendant moved that plaintiff, holder of a small number of defendant's
shares, be required to post security for expenses before commencing the
action. It based its motion upon a New Jersey statute requiring small
shareholders to pay the reasonable expenses of unsuccessful derivative
suits, and to post security for such payment prior to the action. Plaintiff
argued that Federal Rule 23(b) governed instead of the New Jersey
statute, since the Rule also laid down prerequisites to the bringing of a
shareholders' derivative suit, but did not include a security-for-expenses
provision. The Court held that the New Jersey statute was applicable.
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, reiterated that Erie had
defined and narrowed the scope of federal "procedural" law in diversity
actions to "details related to [the diversity court's] ... own conduct of
69 Id. at 533.
70 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
71 For confirmation of this position, examine the articles criticizing Ragan's extension of
Erie-York to the Federal Rules. E.g., Merrigan, "Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on
the Federal Rules," 3 Vand L. Rev. 711, 718-19 (1950). See also Hill, supra note 34, at
431-33; Keeffe et al., supra note 38, at 531; Kurland, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases," 67 Yale L.J. 187, 194-95 (1957).
72 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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business.""u He then held that the New Jersey statute was "substantive"
under Erie because it created "a new liability where none existed before
... .",)4 As for Federal Rule 23 (b), it was held not to be in conflict with
the New Jersey statute. The Rules established certain prerequisites
to commencement of the action, and the statute established others. All
of them could be followed by the federal courts. 5
The Cohen decision was far from unanimous, rumblings of revolt at
this latest extension of Erie-York being evidenced by the Court's six-to-
three division. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, author of the opinion in York,
dissented in part with Mr. Justice Douglas. 6 Mr. Justice Rutledge, fore-
shadowing Hanna v. Plumer, dissented in a lengthy opinion which ques-
tioned the "substantive" classification of the New Jersey bond require-
ment as well as the application of Erie where Rule 23(b) seemed to
govern.7 7
Thus it can be seen that the reaction to Erie, so evident in Hanna,
has in reality been growing over a period of years. Although the major
Erie policies-avoidance of federal invasion of powers guaranteed to the
states by the tenth amendment, elimination of discrimination against non-
diverse parties, and abolition of forum-shopping for favorable substantive
results-were forcefully crystallized by the Court's opinion in the York
case and subsequently carried out in the procession of cases outlined pre-
viously, the dissatisfaction with Erie uniformity stemmed from two
sources. First, the Byrd case indicated a growing discontent with York.
Second, the Erie policies, though applied in Federal Rules cases such s
Cohen and Ragan, were never as thoroughly effectuated in these cases as
they were in those not involving the Federal Rules. These somewhat over-
lapping points of dissatisfaction came to a head in Hanna.
D. Hanna v. Plumer: End of an Epoch?
As foreshadowed by the dissent of three Justices in Cohen, the Su-
preme Court was ripe for revolt against the "dictatorship" of Erie when
Hanna v. Plumer78 came before it in 1965, presenting a direct conflict
between state "procedural" law and the corresponding Federal Rule.
13 Id. at 555.
74 Ibid.
75 Id. at 556.
76 Id. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
77 Ibid. (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
78 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna has provoked a great deal of scholarly comment; see
Grooms, "Substantive or Procedure?" 27 Ala. Lawyer 5 (1966) ; McCoid, "Hanna v. Plumer:
The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape," 51 Va. L. Rev. 884 (1965); Comment, "Choice of Pro-
cedure in Diversity Cases," 75 Yale LJ. 477 (1966); Notes, 51 Cornell L. Q. 551 (1966),
1966 Duke L. J. 142, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 180 (1965), 40 Tul. L. Rev. 202 (1965), 13 U.C.LA.L.
Rev. 41 (1966), 18 Vand. L. Rev. 2046 (1965).
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Hanna marks a sharp turn away from Erie, and may well terminate or at
least curtail the development and extension of that case.
(1) The Facts and Rationale of Hanna. The petitioner in Hanna filed
her complaint in a Massachusetts diversity court. She sought recovery
for automobile accident injuries from the respondent in his capacity as
executor of a deceased Massachusetts resident, alleging that her injuries
had been caused by the decedent's negligence. The respondent had been
served with process which complied with Federal Rule 4(d) (1), but
not with the law of Massachusetts, the forum state."9 The one-year period
allowed by Massachusetts law for amendment of service having expired,
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for noncompliance with forum-
state service requirements. Petitioner argued that, since service is a "pro-
cedural" matter, it is governed by the Federal Rules. Both the district
court and the court of appeals held that state law was applicable. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that:
[Tjhe adoption of Rule 4(d) (1), designed to control service of process in
diversity actions, neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in
the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and ...
the Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court should
have measured the adequacy of service.80
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren went on to discuss the
relation between Erie-York and the Federal Rules. The Erie-York test,
he asserted, does not govern the application of Federal Rules. The validity
of particular Rules under the "substantive-rights" limitation of the Rules
Enabling Act is determined instead under a separate line of cases begin-
ning with Sibback v. Wilson & Co."1
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question fac-
ing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice:
the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to
do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in
their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither
the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.82
Thus, although each standard employs a ','substantive-procedural" test,
the standard for characterizing the Rules differs from that governing
other matters. That difference is justified by the fact that the Rules were
promulgated under "congressional power to make rules governing prac-/
79 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 197, § 9 (1955y, which requires service upon executors by
in-hand delivery.
80 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965). [Footnote omitted.]
81 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Under Sibbach, "procedure" was defined as "the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Id. at 14, quoted in Hanna v.
Plumer, supra note 80, at 464.
82 Id. at 471.
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tice and pleading ... which, though falling within the uncertain area be-
tween substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as,
either.""3
The Court went even further than this holding. Chief Justice Warren
indicated that, even if the Erie-York test were applicable, the Massachu-
setts diversity court might not have been required to follow forum-state
procedure. The "twin aims" of Erie, he stated, were "discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."8"
Addressing himself to these issues he said:
Petitioner, in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where
application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence
to the state rule would have resulted only in altering the way in which
process was served. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service
of defendant's wife to take the place of in-hand service ... alters the mode
of enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently "substantial"
to raise the sort of equal protection problems to which the Erie opinion
alluded.85
Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, disagreed with the majority
on several grounds. His most serious objection was to the Court's exalti-
tion of the Federal Rules over dll other law. This is unconstitutional, he
said, since it permits the Court to infringe upon state-created rights,
thereby altering the constitutional distribution of powers between nation
and state. 6 He next objected to the majority's apparent belief that Erie
was primarily intended to discourage forum-shopping, and pointed out
that its real purpose was to prevent invasion of state powers and the
rights of nondiverse local parties, whether by forum-shopping or other-
wise. 7 Finally, justice Harlan suggested that the Court was incorrect in
its statement that a Federal Rule had never before been rejected in favor
of conflicting forum-state law. Both Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co. 8 and Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,"9 he be-
lieved, would have supported a contrary result in the present case. 0
Mr. Justice Harlan's own proposal for diversity characterization was
more satisfactory.
[T]he proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a
federal rule ... is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice
of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting
83 Id. at 472.
84 Id. at 468.
85 Id. at 469.
86 Id. at 414-75 (concurring opinion).
87 Ibid.
88 337 U.S. 530 (1949), discussed at text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
89 337 U.S. 541 (1949), discussed at text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
90 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476-78 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.
If so, Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule prevail, even in
the face of a conflicting federal rule."1
(2) Hanna: An Evaluation. The thought that strikes one while reading
the majority opinion in Hanna is its similarity to one handed down more
than a century ago-the opinion in Swift v. Tyson 2 In both cases, tif
Court attempted to achieve a specific uniformity at the double cost of
invading state power and infringing indirectly upon the equal protection
clause by discriminating against nondiverse parties. In Swift the Court's
goal was a significant and important one-the equal enforcement of sub-
stantive rights wherever they might be asserted. In Hanna, on the other
hand, the uniformity attained was merely the judicial convenience and
certainty to be derived from the application of the Federal Rules to vir-
tually all diversity cases. If the Court also expected its ruling to secure
the much more worthwhile benefit of speedier disposition of business be-
fore the diversity courts, it neglected to mention that fact.
The Federal Rules are a justifiable object of judicial pride, and were
adopted to resolve procedural difficulties that had always plagued the
federal courts. Those who advocate their enforcement at the expense of
constitutionally guaranteed rights, however, overlook the fact that pro-
cedure, no matter how important, is at best a consideration that is
secondary to the rights it is designed to secure. The evil that will flow
from invasion of state powers, through the application of federal law
where it could have a "substantive" effect upon the rights of parties to
diversity cases, was pungently summarized in Sampson v. Channel 3 by
Judge Magruder.
If the federal court in Massachusetts on points of conflict of laws may
disregard the law of Massachusetts as formulated by the Supreme Judicial
Court and take its own view as a matter of "general law," then the ghost
of Swift v. Tyson . . . still walks abroad, somewhat shrunken in size, yet
capable of much mischief.94
The specific defects of Hanna are these:
First, the Court accomplishes an invasion of individual rights and
state "substantive" powers through an unjustifiable elevation of the
Federal Rules to a constitutional position above those rights and powers
and other federal law.
Second, the Court's conclusion that Erie is inapplicable where Federal
91 Id. at 475. [Emphasis added.]
92 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), discussed at text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
93 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 610 (1940).
94 Id. at 761.
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Rules are concerned is justified neither by the Constitution nor by any
but the most narrow and technical reading of Erie itself.
Third, the Court's conclusion that Erie's primary objective was to pre-
vent forum-shopping led it to assert that the "substantiveness" of a given
rule must be assessed at a time when action under both the rule and the
applicable forum-state law is possible. 5 The primary purpose of Erie,
however, was to insure equal enforcement of state-created rights throughl
out the state in which they are judicially asserted. This being so, it is
difficult to determine why the time at which those rights are asserted has
any bearing on the matter.
Fourth, the rule announced by the Court in Hanna is not really a rule
at all, but merely an assertion that Federal Rules will always be applied
when doubt exists. The Court has defined the area within which the Rules
must be applied as that lying "between substance and procedure," where
matters are "rationally capable of classification as either."96 Is not this a
mere orthodox description of the grey zone whose existence has plagued
diversity courts since the Constitution was adopted? The Court has al-
ways felt obliged to characterize matters lying within that zone in a con-
stitutionally meaningful way. It has now announced that where responsi-
ble characterization is difficult, it will instead apply the Federal Rules,
even at the expense of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Diversity
courts following Hanna will have no guide within that zone, or even a
description of its boundaries, other than the general statement that when
they need a guide they are to bar state law and apply the appropriate
Federal Rule.".
Fifth, even though at first blush the Hanna rule seems to have the vir-
tue of easy application, the few decisions following and interpreting it
suggest that this salutary effect is only apparent.
(3) Hanna: Aftermath. The Hanna decision leaves at least three
problems unsolved. The first of these arises from the failure of the Court
95 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468-69 (1965).
96 Id. at 472.
97 While standards for diversity characterization undoubtedly need revision, that revision
must be accomplished in the light of applicable constitutional principles. A safe general
guide was voiced long ago by an English visitor who made himself an authority on charac-
terization. Speaking not of diversity matters but in general terms, he said:
While each system of law is dearly competent to decide for itself as it sees fit the ques-
tion what rules of its own law are substantive and procedural, the whole foundation of
the conflict of laws requires that a court should restrict the field of its own procedure
and be prepared to follow as far as possible the foreign substantive law. . . .[Wihen
"rights" have clearly arisen under some foreign law . . . the function of the conflict of
laws is to give effect to. . . them, so far as they do not conflict with the public policy
of the forum. This function .. .is defeated by a wide extension of the procedural rules
of the forum ....
Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 247 (1940). [Emphasis added.]
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either to overrule or clearly distinguish Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co.,9 which some commentators felt had presented a "direct
collision" 9 between Federal Rule 3 and forum-state law.10 Specifically,
this means that for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations, it is now
unclear whether Rule 3 will be displaced by a state law providing that
an action is "commenced" by the service of process. 01 More importantly,
it is uncertain whether the Hanna rule will be given a narrow reading or
whether it will be broadly construed to cover cases, such as Ragan, where
arguably both the federal and state rule could be accommodated. Regard-
less of the scope of Hanna, it appears that the Court has replaced the un-
certainty of the Erie-York test, as modified in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Co-op.,102 with the uncertainty of a "direct-collision" test.
The second problem area left by Hanna is one which has existed since
the adoption of the Federal Rules. Since the Rules were adopted under a
congressional delegation of authority,0 3 a particular provision can be
attacked on the ground that it is either outside the scope of the delegated
authority or outside the scope of congressional power. 10 4 These arguments
existed even before Hanna, but now that an attack based on the Erie-York
test is no longer available, they have become the sole arguments for ap-
plication of a state law which conflicts with a Federal Rule. However,
aside from the vague tests laid down in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.'0 5 and
reiterated in Hanna,' there is no standard for delimiting either Con-
gress' power or the Court's authority. In fact, the Sibbach-Hanna treat-
ment of these issues, insofar as it suggests that Congress can decide the
98 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
99 The Hanna Court stated that it had "never before been confronted with a case where
the applicable Federal Rule [was] . . . in direct collision with the law of the relevant
State." Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 95, at 472.
100 See the authorities cited in note 71 supra.
1 See Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and Callan
v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600, 601-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), indicating that Hanna has over-
ruled Ragan. But see Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966), holding that Ragan had not been overruled. The position of the Sixth
Circuit seems to be the correct one, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court stated
specifically in Hanna that no prior case had presented a "direct collision" between a Federal
Rule and state law. Moreover, in Hanna the Court alluded to Ragan, but gave no indication
that it would be weakened by the case being decided. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63
n.1, 466 n_5 (1965).
102 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
103 The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), quoted at note 31 supra.
104 An argument attacking congressional power to authorize a particular Rule would have
to be based on the tenth amendment and show that the regulated area is not one specifically
committed to Congress by the Constitution. An attack directed at the authority of the
Court to adopt a particular Rule would ultimately resolve itself into construction of the
Rules Enabling Act. In Sibbach and Hanna, the Court suggested that an attack on either
ground is not likely to be successful; see Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 101, at 471; Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1941).
105 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
106 Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 101, at 471 (1965).
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scope of its own powers in promulgating federal "procedural" law, seems
to foreclose effective attack on the rule-making power. In so doing it
raises significant constitutional problems regarding the separation of
powers.
Finally, the Hanna dictum ° 7 raises problems not only where the Fed-
eral Rules are involved, but in all diversity cases where there is a con-
flict between federal and state law. Under this latest modification of the
Erie-York test, courts must examine each case, not solely in terms of
"outcome," but also in terms of whether application of federal law will
encourage forum-shopping or "alter the mode of enforcement of state-
created rights in a fashion sufficiently 'substantial' to raise . . . equal
protection problems .... 10' This new standard, vague as it'is, appears
to go beyond the test of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op.," 9 in that it
does not require the existence of a "strong federal policy," in the Byrd
sense, before a federal law will displace applicable state law.
The kind of problem presented by the Hanna dictum is particularly
evident where state "door-closing" statutes are involved. Before Hanna,
it was settled that such statutes were "substantive" for Erie purposes,
because clearly outcome determinative. Therefore, they were applicable
to suits brought in diversity courts. 10 In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.,"' however, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the policy behind a
particular door-closing statute must be examined and weighed against
any countervailing federal policies. After such an examination, the court
held that it was not bound by the applicable South Carolina statute." 2
CONCLUSION
The primary problem in the area of diversity jurisdiction is created by
the constitutional requirement that diversity courts must apply state law
to issues of "substance" but may use their own rules where matters of
"procedure" are concerned. The problem lies in formulating a test or
standard with which to draw a reliable line between these two basic but
ephemeral areas. It is clear that new concepts of the two terms involved
must be formed, and those charged with the formulation of the new char-
acterization standard must keep three considerations in mind. First,
107 Id. at 466-69; see text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
108 Id. at 469.
109 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
110 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.
183 (1947).
1l 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), 51 Cornell L.Q. 560 (1966).
112 The Szantay case is distinguishable from Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra
note 110, and Angel v. Bullington, supra note 110, in that in Woods and Angel there were
strong state policies which favored application of the state door-closing statutes in the
diversity courts. The Szantay court found no such countervailing state policy.
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state-created rights were designed for the benefit of individuals, whether
they are asserted in state or diversity courts. These rights must be fully
protected unless they conflict with rights and powers constitutionally
within the domain of the federal government. Second, the required stan.
dard must be reliable but flexible, and designed for case-by-case applica.
tion; arbitrary rules are of no value in this area.1 ' Third, all problems.
of diversity jurisdiction must be resolved in the light of our federal sys-
tem; no solution is acceptable if it alters the rights and relationshipf
existing within that system.
113 See Cook, "'Substance' and Trocedure' in the Conffict of Laws," 42 Yale LJ. 333,
343 (1933); Robertson, supra note 97, at 245.
